REPORT OF APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD

The Honorable Thomas 0. Paine
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
June 15, 1970

Dear Dr. Paine:

Pursuant to your directives of April 17 and April 21, 1970, I am
transmitting the final Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

Concurrent with this transmittal, I have recessed the Board, subject
to call.

We plan to reconvene later this year when most of the remaining special
tests have been completed, in order to review the results of these tests
to determine whether any modifications to our findings, determinations, or
recommendations are necessary. In addition, we will stand ready to
reconvene at your request.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar M. Cortright

Preface

     The Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's third mission to explore
the surface of the Moon, is a harsh reminder of the immense difficulty of
this undertaking.

     The total Apollo system of ground complexes, launch vehicle, and
spacecraft constitutes the most ambitious and demanding engineering
development ever undertaken by man. For these missions to succeed, both
men and equipment must perform to near perfection.  That this system has
already resulted in two successful lunar surface explorations is a tribute
to those men and women who conceived, designed, built, and flew it.

     Perfection is not only difficult to achieve, but difficult to
maintain.  The imperfection in Apollo 13 constituted a near disaster,
averted only by outstanding performance on the part of the crew and the
ground control team which supported them.

     The Apollo 13 Review Board was charged with the responsibilities of
reviewing the circumstances surrounding the accident, of establishing the
probable causes of the accident, of assessing the effectiveness of flight
recovery actions, of reporting these findings, and of developing
recommendations for corrective or other actions. The Board has made every
effort to carry out its assignment in a thorough, objective, and impartial
manner. In doing so, the Board made effective use of the failure analyses
and corrective action studies carried out by the Manned Spacecraft Center
and was very impressed with the dedication and objectivity of this effort.

     The Board feels that the nature of the Apollo 13 equipment failure
holds important lessons which, when applied to future missions, will
contribute to the safety and effectiveness of manned space flight.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
PREFACE
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 - AUTHORITIES
Memorandum, April 17, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright

Memorandum, April 21, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright

Memorandum, April 20, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Dr. Charles D. Harrington,
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Memorandum, April 20, 1970, from Administrator to
Mr. Dale D. Myers, Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight

NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, Subject:
Mission Failure Investigation Policy and Procedures,
April 14, 1966

NASA Management Instruction 1156.14, Subject:
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, December 7, 1967 . . .

CHAPTER 2 - BOARD HISTORY AND PROCEDURES

Part 1. Summary of Board History and Procedures
Part 2. Biography of Board Members, Observers, and Panel Chairmen
Part 3. Board Organization and General Assignments for Board Panels
Part 4. Summary of Board Activities

CHAPTER 3 - DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE AND
MISSION

Part 1. Apollo/Saturn V Space Vehicle
Part 2. Apollo 13 Mission Description

Chapter 4 - REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF APOLLO 13 ACCIDENT
Part 1. Introduction
Part 2. Oxygen Tank No. History
Part 3. Apollo 13 Flight
Part 4. Summary Analysis of the Accident
Part 5. Apollo 13 Recovery

CHAPTER 5 - FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Part 1. Introduction
Part 2. Assessment of Accident
Part 3. Supporting Considerations
Part 4. Recommendations

APPENDIX A - BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND
OPERATIONS

APPENDIX B - REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL

APPENDIX C - REPORT OF MANUFACTURING AND TEST PANEL

APPENDIX D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL

APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT PANEL

APPENDIX F - SPECIAL TESTS AND ANALYSES

APPENDIX G - BOARD ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

APPENDIX H - BOARD RELEASES AND PRESS STATEMENTS

CHAPTER 1
AUTHORITIES

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON. D.C 20546

April 17, 1970

TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright
SUBJECT : Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board

REFERENCES: (a) NMI 8621.1 - Mission Failure Investigation Policy
                and Procedures

            (b) NMI 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

1. It is NASA policy as stated in Reference (a) "to investigate and
document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the
conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take appropriate
corrective actions as a result of the findings and recommendations."

2. Because of the serious nature of the accident of the Apollo 13
spacecraft which jeopardized human life and caused failure of the Apollo
13 lunar mission, we hereby establish the Apollo 13 Review Board
(hereinafter referred to as the Board) and appoint you Chairman. The
members of the Board will be qualified senior individuals from NASA and
other Government agencies.  After consultation with you, we will:

     (a) Appoint the members of the Board and make any subsequent changes
necessary for the effective operation of the Board: and

     (b) Arrange for timely release of information on the operations,
findings, and recommendations of the Board to the Congress, and, through
the NASA Office of Public Affairs, to the public. The Board will report
its findings and recommendations directly to us.

3. The Board will:

     (a) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to the
spacecraft which occurred during the flight of Apollo 13 and the
subsequent flight and ground actions taken to recover, in order to
establish the probable cause or causes of the accident and assess the
effectiveness of the recovery actions.

     (b) Review all factors relating to the accident and recovery actions
the Board determines to be significant and relevant, including studies,
findings, recommendations, and other actions that have been or may be
undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and contractors

     (c) Direct such further specific investigations as may be necessary.

     (d) Report as soon as possible its findings relating to the cause or
causes of the accident and the effectiveness of the flight and ground
recovery actions.

     (e) Develop recommendations for corrective or other actions, based
upon its findings and determinations or conclusions derived
therefrom.

     (f) Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations and
submit a final report.

4. As Chairman of the Board you are delegated the following powers:

     (a) To establish such procedures for the organization and operation
of the Board as you find most effective; such procedures shall be part of
the Board's records. The procedures shall be furnished the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel for its review and comment.

     (b) To establish procedures to assure the execution of your
responsibilities in your absence.

     (c) To designate such representatives, consultants, experts, liaison
officers, observers, or other individuals as required to support the
activities of the Board. You shall define their duties and
responsibilities as part of the Board's records.

     (d) To keep us advised periodically concerning the organization,
procedures, operations of the Board and its associated activities.

5. By separate action we are requesting the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel established by Reference (b) to review both the procedures and
findings of the Board and submit its independent report to us.

6. By separate action we are directing the Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight to:

     (a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space Flight
cooperate fully with the Board and provide records, data, and technical
support as requested.

     (b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews,
studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop recommendations
to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14 mission
with respect to hardware, operational procedures, and other aspects of the
Apollo program.

7. All elements of NASA will cooperate with the Board and provide full
support within their areas of responsibility.

George M. Low
Deputy Administrator

T. O. Paine
Administrator

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON. D.C.     20546

Office of the Administrator                          April 21, 1970

TO: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright

SUBJECT: Membership of Apollo 13 Review Board

Reference: Memorandum to you of April 17, subject: Establishment of
Apollo 13 Review Board

In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Reference (a), the membership of the
Apollo 13 Review Board is established as follows:

Members:

Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman (Director, Langley Research Center)
Mr. Robert F. Allnutt (Assistant to the Administrator, NASA Hqs.)
Mr. Neil Armstrong (Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center)
Dr. John F. Clark (Director, Goddard Space Flight Center)
Brig. General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (Director of Space, DCS/RED,
Hqs., USAF)
Mr. Vincent L. Johnson (Deputy Associate Administrator-Engineering,
Office of Space Science and Applications)
Mr. Milton Klein (Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office)
Dr. Hans M. Mark, Director, Ames Research Center)

Counsel:

Mr. George Malley (Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center)

OMSF Technical Support:

Mr. Charles W. Mathews (Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of
Manned Space Flight)

Observers:

Mr. William A. Anders (Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics
and Space Council)

Dr. Charles D. Harrington (Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel)
Mr. I. I. Pinkel (Director, Aerospace Safety Research and
Data Institute, Lewis Research Center)

Congressional Liaison:
Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoff (Office of Legislative Affairs, NASA Hqs.)

Public Affairs Liaison:
Mr. Brian Duff (Public Affairs Officer. Manned Spacecraft Center)

In accordance with applicable NASA instruction, you are authorized to
appoint such experts and additional consultants as are required for the
effective operations of the Board.

George M. Low
Deputy Administrator

T. O. Paine
Administrator

     NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
     WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

April 20, 1970

Office of the Administrator

T0 : Dr. Charles D. Harrington
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

SUBJECT:  Review of Procedures and Findings of Apollo 13 Review
Board

Attachment: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M.
Cortright,
Subject: Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board

References: (a) Section 6, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
                Authorization Act, 1968

            (b) NMI 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

1. In accordance with References (a) and (b), the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (hereafter referred to as the Panel) is requested to review
the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13 Review Board (hereafter
referred to as the Board) established by Attachment (a).

2. The procedures established by the Board will be made available to the
Panel for review and comment as provided in paragraph 4(a) of Attachment
(a).

3. As Chairman of the Panel, you are designated an Observer on the Board.
In this capacity, you, or another member of the Panel designated by you,
are authorized to be present at those regular meetings of the Board you
desire to attend.  You are also authorized to receive oral progress
reports from the Chairman of the Board or his designee from time to time
to enable you to keep the Panel fully informed on the work of the Board.

4. The final report and any interim reports of the Board will be made
available promptly to the Panel for its review.

5. The Panel is requested to report to us on the procedures and findings
of the Board at such times and in such form as you consider appropriate,
but no later than 10 days after the submission to us of the final report
of the Board.

George M. Low, Deputy Administrator    T. O. Paine, Administrator

Enclosure
cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board
M/Mr. Dale Myers

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C 20546

April 20, 1970
OFFICE or THE ADMINISTRATOR

TO : Mr. Dale D. Myers

Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight

SUBJECT : Apollo 13 Review

References: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M.
Cortright,
subject: Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board

(b) Memorandum dated April 20, 1970, to Dr. Charles D.
Harrington, subject: Review of Procedures and Findings
of Apollo 13 Review Board

1. As indicated in paragraph 6 of Reference (a), you are directed to:

(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space Flight
cooperate fully with the Board in providing records, data, and technical
support as requested.

(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews, studies,
and supporting actions as are required to develop timely recommendations
to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14 mission
with respect to hardware, operational procedures, flight crews, and other
aspects of the Apollo Program

2. The recommendations referred to in paragraph l(b) above should be
submitted to us in such form and at such time as you deem appropriate, but
a report should be submitted no later than ten days after the Apollo 13
Review Board submits its final report.

3. The assignments to the Apollo 13 Review Board and to the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel by References (a) and (b), respectively, in no way
relieve you of your continuing full responsibility for the conduct of the
Apollo and other OMSF programs.

Deputy Administrator                          Administrator

cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board
Mr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel

NMI  8621.1

April 14, 1966

Management Instruction
SUBJECT: MISSION FAILURE INVESTIGATION POLICY AND
PROCEDURES

1. PURPOSE

This Instruction establishes the policy and procedures for investigating
and documenting the causes of all major mission failures which occur in
the conduct of NASA space and aeronautical activities.

2. APPLICABILITY

This Instruction is applicable to NASA Headquarters and field
installations.

3. DEFINITION

For the purpose of this Instruction, the following term shall apply:

Instruction: Failure is defined as not achieving a major mission
objective.

4. POLICY

a. It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major
mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and aeronautical
activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a result of the
findings and recommendations.

b. The Deputy Administrator may conduct independent investigations of
major failures in addition to those investigations required of the
Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices as set forth in
paragraph 5a

5. PROCEDURES

a. Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices are responsible,
within their assigned areas, for:

(1) Informing promptly the Deputy Administrator of each major
failure and apprising him of the nature of the failure, status
of investigations, and corrective or other actions which are
or will be taken.

(2) Determining the causes or probable causes of all failures,
taking corrective or other actions, and submitting written
reports of such determinations and actions to the Deputy
Administrator.

b. When the Deputy Administrator decides to conduct an independent
investigation, he will:

(l) Establish a (name of project) Review Board, comprised of
appropriate NASA officials;

(2) Define the specific responsibilities of each Board, encompassing
such tasks as:

(a) Reviewing the findings, determinations and corrective or other
actions which have been developed by contractors, field
installations and the Official-in-Charge of cognizant
Headquarters Program Office and presenting the Boards
conclusions as to their adequacy to the Deputy Administrator.

(b) Reviewing the findings during the course of investigations
with cognizant field installation and Headquarters officials.

(c) Recommending such additional steps (for example additional
tests) as are considered desirable, to determine the
technical and operational causes or probable causes of
failure, and to obtain evidence of nontechnical contributing
factors.

(d) Developing recommendations for corrective and other actions,
based on all information available to the Board.

(e) Documenting findings, determinations and recommendations for
corrective or other actions and submitting such
documentation to the Deputy Administrator.

c. Procedures for implementing the Board's recommendations shall be
determined by the Deputy Administrator.

6 CANCELLATION

NASA Management Manual Instruction 4-1-7 (T.S. 760), March 24,
l964.

Deputy Administrator

DISTRIBUTION:
SDL l

NMI 1156.14

December 7, 1967
Effective Date

Management  Instruction
SUBJECT: AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL

1. PURPOSE

This Instruction sets forth the authority for, and the duties,
procedures, organization, and support of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel.

2. AUTHORITY

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (hereafter called the "Panel"
was established under Section 6 of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Authorization Act, 1968 (PL 90-67, 90th
Congress, 81 Stat. I68, 170). Since the Panel was established by
statute, its formation and use are not subject to the provisions of
Executive Order 11007 or of NMI 1150.2, except to the extent that
such provisions are made applicable to the Panel under this
Instruction.

3. DUTIES

a. The duties of the Panel are set forth in Section 6 of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization
Act, 1968, as follows:

"The Panel shall review safety studies and operations plans referred to it
and shall make reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator with
respect to the hazards of proposed or existing facilities and proposed
operations and with respect to the adequacy of proposed or existing safety
standards, and shall perform such other duties as the Administrator may
request."

b. Pursuant to carrying out its statutory duties, the Panel will
review, evaluate, and advise on all elements of NASA's
safety system, including especially the industrial safety,
systems safety, and public safety activities, and the management of
these activities. These key elements of NASA's safety system are
identified and delineated as follows:

(1) Industrial Safety. This element includes those activities
which, on a continuing basis, provide protection for the well
being of personnel and prevention of damage to property
involved in NASA's business and exposed to potential hazards
associated with carrying out this business. Industrial safety
relates especially to the operation of facilities in the many
programs of research, development, manufacture, test,
operation, and maintenance. Industrial safety activities
include, but are not limited to, such functions as

(a) Determination of industrial safety criteria.

(b) Establishment and implementation of safety standards
and procedures for operation and maintenance of
facilities, especially test and hazardous
environment facilities.

(c) Development of safety requirements for the design of
new facilities.

(d) Establishment and implementation of safety standards
and procedures for operation of program support and
administrative aircraft.

(2) Systems Safety. This element includes those activities
specifically organized to deal with the potential hazards of
complex R&D systems that involve many highly specialized
areas of technology. It places particular emphasis on
achieving safe operation of these systems over their life
cycles, and it covers major systems for aeronautical and
space flight activities, manned or unmanned, including
associated groundbased research, development, manufacturing,
and test activities. Systems safety activities include, but
are not limited to, such functions as:

(a) Determination of systems safety criteria, including
criteria for crew safety.

(b) Determination of safety data requirements.

(c) Performance of systems safety analyses.

(d) Establishment and implementation of systems safety
plans.

(3) Public Safety. This element includes those activities which, on
a continuing basis, provide protection for the well being of
people and prevention of damage to property not involved in
NASA's business, but which may nevertheless be exposed to
potential hazards associated with carrying out this business.
Public safety activities include, but are not limited to,
such functions as:

(a) Determination of public safety criteria.

(b) Establishment and control of public safety hazards
associated with facility and systems tests and
operations.

(c) Establishment and implementation, as required,
of emergency or catastrophe control plans.

(4) Safety Management. This element includes both the program and
functional organizations of NASA and its contractors involved
in the identification of potential hazards and their
elimination or control as set forth in the foregoing
description of safety activities. It also includes the
management systems for planning, implementing, coordinating,
and controlling these activities. These management systems
include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) The authorities, responsibilities, and working
relationships of the organizations involved in safety
activities, and the assessment of their
effectiveness.

(b) The procedures for insuring the currency and continuity
of safety activities, especially systems safety
activities which may extend over long periods of time
and where management responsibilities are transferred
during the life cycles of the systems.

(c) The plans and procedures for accident/incident
investigations, including those for the follow-up on
corrective actions and the feedback of accident/incident
information to other involved or interested
organizations.

(d) The analysis and dissemination of safety data.

4. PROCEDURES

a. The Panel will function in an advisory capacity to the Administrator,
and, through him, to those organizational elements responsible for
management of the NASA safety activities.

b. The Panel will be provided with all information required to discharge
its advisory responsibilities as they pertain to both NASA and its
contractors' safety activities. This information will be made available
through the mechanism of appropriate reports, and by means of in situ
reviews of safety activities at the various NASA and contractor sites, as
deemed necessary by the Panel and arranged through the Administrator. The
Panel will thus be enabled to examine and evaluate not only the general
status of the NASA safety system, but also the key elements of the planned
and on-going activities in this system.

5. ORGANIZATION

a. Membership

(1) The Panel will consist of a maximum of nine members, who will
be appointed by the Administrator. Appointments will be for a
term of six years, except that, in order to provide continuity
of membership, one-third of the members appointed originally
to the Panel will be appointed for a term of two years,
one-third for a term of four years, and one-third for a term
of six years.

(2) Not more than four members of the Panel shall be employees
of NASA, nor shall such NASA members constitute a majority
of the composition of the Panel at any given time.

(3) Compensation and travel allowances for panel members shall be
as specified in Section 6 of the NASA Authorization Act,
1968.

b. Officers

(1) The Officers of the Panel shall be a Chairman and a Vice
Chairman, who shall be selected by the Panel from their
membership to serve for one-year terms.

(2) The Chairman, or Vice Chairman in his absence, shall preside at
all meetings of the Panel and shall have the usual powers of a
presiding officer.

c. Committees

(1) The Panel is authorized to establish special committees, as
necessary and as approved by the Administrator, to carry out
specified tasks within the scope of duties of the Panel.

(2) All such committee activities will be considered an
inseparable extension of Panel activities, and will be in
accordance with all applicable procedures and regulations
set forth in this Instruction.

(3) The Chairman of each special committee shall be a member of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. The other committee members
may or may not be members of the Panel, as recommended by the
Panel and approved by the Administrator.

(4) Appointment of Panel members to committees as officers or
members will be either for one year, for the duration of their
term as Panel members, or for the lifetime of the committee,
whichever is the shortest. Appointments of non-Panel members
to committees will be for a period of one year or for the
lifetime of the committee, whichever is shorter.

(5) Compensation and travel allowances for committee members who
are not members of the Panel shall be the same as for members
of the Panel itself, except that compensation for such
committee members appointed from outside the Federal
Government shall be at the rate prescribed by the
Administrator for comparable-services.

d. Meetings

(1) Regular meetings of the Panel will be held as often as
necessary and at least twice a year. One meeting each year
shall be an Annual Meeting. Business conducted at this
meeting will include selecting the Chairman and the Vice
Chairman of the Panel, recommending new committees and
committee members as required or desired, approving the
Panel's annual report to the Administrator, and such other
business as may be required.

(2) Special meetings of the Panel may be called by the Chairman,
by notice served personally upon or by mail or telegraph to
the usual address of each member at least five days prior to
the meeting.

 (3) Special meetings shall be called in the same manner by the
Chairman, upon the written request of three members of
the Panel.

(4) If practicable, the object of a special meeting should be sent
in writing to all members, and if possible a special meeting
should. be avoided by obtaining the views of members by mail
or otherwise, both on the question requiring the meeting and
on the question of calling a special meeting.

(5) All meetings of special committees will be called by their
respective chairmen pursuant to and in accordance with
performing their specified tasks.

(6) Minutes of all meetings of the Panel, and of special committees
established by the Panel, will be kept. Such minutes shall, at
a minimum, contain a record of persons present, a description
of matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of
all reports received, issued, or approved by the Panel or
committee. The accuracy of all minutes will be certified to by
the Chairman of the Panel (or by the Vice Chairman in his
absence) or of the committee.

e. Reports and Records

(1) The Panel shall submit an annual report to the
Administrator.

(2) The Panel will submit to the Administrator reports on all
safety reviews and evaluations with comments and
recommendations as deemed appropriate by the Panel.

(3) All records and files of the Panel, including agendas, minutes
of Panel and committee meetings, studies, analyses, reports,
or other data compilations or work papers, made available to
or prepared by or for the Panel, will be retained by the
Panel.

f. Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest

(1) Nongovernmental members of the Panel, and of special
committees established by the Panel, are "Special
Government Employees" within the meaning of NHB 1900.2A,
which sets forth guidance to NASA Special Government
employees regarding the avoidance of conflicts of interest
and the observance of ethical standards of conduct. A
copy of NHB 1900.2A and related NASA instructions on
conflicts of interest will be furnished to each Panel or
committee member at the time of his appointment as a NASA
consultant or expert.

(2) Nongovernmental members of the Panel or a special committee
will submit a "NASA Special Government Employees
Confidential Statement of Employment and Financial
Interests" (NASA Form 1271) prior to participating in the
activities of the Panel or a special committee.

6. SUPPORT

a. A staff, to be comprised of full-time NASA employees, shall be
established to support the Panel. The members of this staff will be
fully responsive to direction from the Chairman or the Panel.

b. The director of this staff will serve as Executive Secretary to the
Panel. The Executive Secretary of the Panel, in accordance with the
specific instructions from the Chairman of the Panel, shall:

(1) Administer the affairs of the Panel and have general supervision
of all arrangements for safety reviews and evaluations, and
other matters undertaken by the Panel.

(2) Insure that a written record is kept of all transactions, and
submit the same to the Panel for approval at each subsequent
meeting.

(3) Insure that the same service is provided for all special
committees of the Panel.

Administrator

CFR Title 14, Chapter 5, Subpart 1209.5.

     PART 1. SUMMARY OF BOARD HISTORY AND PROCEDURES

     The Apollo 13 Review Board was established on April 17, 1970, by the
NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator under the authority of NASA
Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966. In the letter
establishing the Board, Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Director of Langley
Research Center, was appointed as Chairman and the general responsibili-
ties of the Board were set forth. The seven additional members of the
Board were named in a letter from the Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator to the Chairman, dated April 21, 1970. This letter also
designated a Manned Space Flight Technical Support official, a Counsel to
the Board, several other supporting officials, and several observers from
various organizations. In addition, in a letter dated April 20, 1970, to
Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel, that Panel was requested to review the Board's procedures and
findings.

     The Review Board convened at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston,
Texas, on Tuesday, April 21, 1970. Four Panels of the Board were formed,
each under the overview of a member of the Board. Each of the Panels was
chaired by a senior official experienced in the area of review assigned to
the Panel. In addition, each Panel was manned by a number of specialists,
thereby providing a nucleus of expertise for the review activity. During
the period of the Board's review activities, the Chairmen of the four
Panels were responsible for the conduct of evaluations, analyses, and
other studies bearing on their Panel assignments, for preparing
preliminary findings and recommendations, and for developing other
information for the Board's consideration. To overview these Panel
efforts, each member of the Board assumed specific responsibilities
related to the overall review.

     In addition to the direct participants in the Board activity, a
number of observers and consultants also attended various meetings of the
Board or its constituent Panels. These individuals assisted the Review
Board participants with advice and counsel in their areas of expertise and
responsibilities.

     While the Board's intensive review activities were underway, the
Manned Spacecraft Center Apollo 13 Investigation Team, under James A.
McDivitt, Colonel, USAF, was also conducting its own analysis of the
accident on Apollo 13. Coordination between the Investigation Team work
and the Apollo 13 Review Board activities was effected through the MSF
Technical Support official and by maintaining a close and continuing
working relationship between the Panel Chairmen and officials of the MSC
Investigation Team.

     The Board Chairman established a series of administrative procedures
to guide the Board's activities. In addition, specific assignments of
responsibility were made to all individuals involved in the Board's
activities so as to insure an efficient review activity. Overall logistic
and administrative support was provided by MSC.

     The Board conducted both Executive and General Sessions. During the
Executive Sessions, plans were agreed upon for guiding the Board's
activities and for establishing priorities for tests, analyses, studies,
and other Board efforts. At the General Sessions, status of Panel
activities was reviewed by the Board with a view towards coordination and
integration of all review activities. In addition, Board members regularly
attended daily status meetings of the Manned Spacecraft Center
Investigation Team.

     In general, the Board relied on Manned Spacecraft Center postmission
evaluation activities to provide the factual data upon which evaluation,
assessment, and analysis efforts could be based. However, the Board,
through a regular procedure, also levied specific data collection,
reduction, and analysis requirements on MSC. Test support for the Board
was conducted primarily at MSC but also included tests run at other NASA
Centers. Members of the Board and its Panels also visited a number of
contractor facilities to review manufacturing, assembly, and test
procedures applicable to the Apollo 13 mission.

     The Chairman of the Board provided the NASA Deputy Administrator with
oral progress reports. These reports summarized the status of Review Board
activities at the time and outlined the tasks still ahead. All material
used in these interim briefings was incorporated into the Board's official
files.

     As a means of formally transmitting its findings, determinations, and
recommendations, the Board chose the format of this Final Report which
includes both the Board's Judgments as well as the reports of the
individual Panels.

     A general file of all the data and information collected and examined
by the Board has been established at the Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia. In addition, the MSC Investigation Team established a file of
data at MSC.

PART 2. BIOGRAPHIES OF BOARD MEMBERS, OBSERVERS, AND PANEL
CHAIRMEN

CHAIRMAN OF THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD
EDGAR M. CORTRIGHT'
NASA Langley Research Center

     Edgar M. Cortright, 46, Director of the NASA Langley Research Center,
Hampton, Virginia, is Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Mr.Cortright has been an aerospace scientist and administrator for
22 years. He began his career at NASA's Lewis Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1948 and for the next 10 years specialized in research on high-
speed aerodynamics there.

     In October 1958, Mr. Cortright was named Chief of Advanced Technology
Programs at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., where he directed ini-
tial formulation of NASA's Meteorological Satellite Program. In 1960, he
became Assistant Director for Lunar and Planetary Programs and directed
the planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner, Ranger, and
Surveyor.

     Mr. Cortright became Deputy Director of the Office of Space Sciences
in 1961, and Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and Appli-
cations in 1965, in which capacities he served as General Manager of
NASA's space flight program using automated spacecraft. He joined the
Office of Manned Space Flight as Deputy Associate Administrator in 1967
and served in a similar capacity until he was appointed Director of the
Langley Research Center in 1968.

     He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics and of the American Astronautical Society. He has received the
Arthur S. Fleming Award, the NASA Medal for Outstanding Leadership, and
the NASA Medal for Distinguished Service.

     Mr. Cortright is the author of numerous technical reports and
articles, and compiled and edited the book, "Exploring Space With a
Camera".

     He is a native of Hastings, Pennsylvania, and served as a U.S. Navy
officer in World War II. He received Bachelor and Master of Science
degrees in aeronautical engineering from the Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute.

Mr. and Mrs. Cortright are the parents of two children.

ROBERT F. ALLNUTT
NASA Headquarters

     Robert F, Allnutt, 34, Assistant to the NASA Administrator,
Washington, D C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Mr. Allnutt was named to his present position this year. Prior to
that, he had been Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs since
1967.

     He joined NASA in 1960 as a patent attorney at the Langley Research
Center, Hampton, Virginia. In 1961, he was transferred to NASA
Headquarters Washington, D. C.

     Mr. Allnutt served as Patent Counsel for Communications Satellite
Corporation from January to September 1965, when he returned to NASA
Headquarters as Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters.

     He is admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia and
the state of Virginia and is a member of the American Bar Association and
the Federal Bar Association.

     Mr. Allnutt was graduated from Virginia Polytechnic Institute with
a B.S. degree in industrial engineering. He received Juris Doctor and
Master of Laws degrees from George Washington University Law
School.

     Mr. and Mrs. Allnutt are the parents of two sons. The family lives
in Washington, D. C

NEIL A. ARMSTRONG
NASA Astronaut

     Neil A. Armstrong, 39, NASA astronaut, is a member of the Apollo 13
Review Board.

     Commander of the Apollo 11 mission and the first man on the Moon Mr.
Armstrong has distinguished himself as an astronaut and as an engineering
test pilot.

     Prior to joining the astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft Center,
Houston, Texas, in 1962, Mr. Armstrong was an X-15 rocket aircraft project
pilot at the NASA Flight Research Center, Edwards, California.

     Mr. Armstrong joined NASA at the Lewis Research Center, Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1955, and later transferred to the Flight Research Center as an
aeronautical research pilot.

     His initial space flight was as command pilot of Gemini VIII,
launched March 16, 1966. He performed the first successful docking of two
vehicles in space. The flight was terminated early due to a mal-
functioning thruster, and the crew was cited for exceptional piloting
skill in overcoming the problem and accomplishing a safe landing.  He has
served on backup crews for both Gemini and APOLLO.

     Mr. Armstrong is a Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots,
Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, and member of the Soaring Society of America. He has re-
ceived the Institute of Aerospace Sciences Octave Chanute Award, the AIAA
Astronautics Award, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, the John F.
Montgomery Award, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

     He is a native of Wapakoneta, Ohio, and received a B.S. degree in
aeronautical engineering from Purdue University and a M.S. degree from the
University of Southern California. He was a naval aviator from 1949 to
1952 and flew 78 combat missions during the Korean action.

Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong have two sons.

JOHN F CLARK

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

     Dr. John F. Clark, 49, Director of the NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review
Board.

     He is an internationally known authority on atmospheric and space
sciences, holds four patents in electronic circuits and systems, and has
written many scientific papers on atmospheric physics, electronics, and
mathematics.

     Dr. Clark joined NASA in 1958 and served in the Office of Space
Flight Programs at NASA Headquarters until 1961 when he was named Director
of Geophysics and Astronomy Programs, Office of Space Sciences. From 1962
until 1965, he was Director of Sciences and Chairman of the Space Science
Steering Committee, Office of Space Science and Applications.

     In 1965, Dr. Clark was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for
Space Science and Applications (Sciences), and later that year, Acting
Director of Goddard. He was named director of the center in 1966.

     Dr. Clark began his career in 1942 as an electronics engineer at the
Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. From 1947 to 1948 he was
Assistant Professor of Electronic Engineering at Lehigh University,
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. He returned to NRL in 1948; and prior to Join-
ing NASA, served as head of the Atmospheric Electricity Branch there.

     He is a member of the American Association of Physics Teachers,
American Geophysical Union, Scientific Research Society of America,
Philosophical Society of Washington, the International Scientific Radio
Union, and the Visiting Committee on Physics, Lehigh University. He
received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Service, Outstanding Leadership,
and Distinguished Service.

     Dr. Clark was born in Reading, Pennsylvania. He received a B.S.
degree in electrical engineering from Lehigh University, M.S. degree in
mathematics from George Washington University, and Ph. D. in physics from
the University of Maryland.

     Dr. and Mrs. Clark have two children and live in Silver Springs,
Maryland.

WALTER R. HEDRICK, JR.
Headquarters, USAF

     Brig. Gen. Walter R. Hedrick, Jr., 48, Director of Space, Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, Headquarters,
USAF, Washington, D.C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     He has participated in most of the Air Force's major nuclear test
projects and has extensive experience as a technical project officer
and administrator.

     General Hedrick Joined the Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet in
1941 and flew in combat with the 86th Fighter Bomber Group during World
War II. After the War, he was assigned to the 19th Air Force, the 14th Air
Force, and as a project officer under Air Force Secretary Stuart
Symington. From 1952 to 1955, he was assigned to the Air Force Office of
Atomic Energy.

     In 1955, he was assigned to the Technical Operations Division, Air
Force Special Weapons Command, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. In
1957, he was named Commander of the 4951st Support Squadron, Eniwetok; and
the following year, he was reassigned to Kirtland AFB as Assistant to the
Group Commander and later as Air Commander of the 4925th Test Group.

General Hedrick Joined the Special Systems Office, Air Force Ballistics
Division, Los Angeles, in 1960. He was named Commander of the Satellite
Control Facility in 1965, and in 1966, he was appointed Deputy Commander,
Air Force Systems Command. He received his present assignment in 1967.

     General Hedrick is a Command Pilot and has received numerous Air
Force awards.

     His home town is Fort Worth, Texas, and he attended Texas Techno-
logical College, Lubbock, prior to joining the service. He received B.S.
and M.S. degrees in physics from the University of Maryland.

General and Mrs. Hedrick are the Parents of two sons.

VINCENT L. JOHNSON
NASA Headquarters

     Vincent L Johnson, 51, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space
Science and Applications (Engineering), NASA Headquarters, is a member of
the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Mr. Johnson was appointed to his present position in 1967. Prior to
that time, he had been Director of the Launch Vehicle and Propulsion
Programs Division, Office of Space Science and Applications, since 1964.
He was responsible for the management and development of the light and
medium launch vehicles used for NASA's unmanned earth orbital and deep
space programs. His division also directed studies of future unmanned
launch vehicle and propulsion system requirements.

     Mr. Johnson joined NASA in 1960, coming from the Navy Department
where he had been an engineer with the Bureau of Weapons. His first
assignments with NASA were as Program Manager for the Scout, Delta, and
Centaur launch vehicles.

     He was a naval officer during World War II, serving with the Bureau
of Ordnance. Prior to that, he was a physicist with the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory.

     Mr. Johnson was born in Red Wing, Minnesota, and attended the
University of Minnesota.

     He and Mrs. Johnson live in Bethesda, Maryland. They are the
parents of two children.

MILTON KLEIN
NASA Headquarters

     Milton Klein, 46, Manager, Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, NASA
Headquarters, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Mr. Klein has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to that
he had been Deputy Manager since 1960. The Space Nuclear Propulsion Office
is a joint activity of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. The office conducts the national
nuclear rocket program. He is also Director of the Division of Space
Nuclear Systems of the AEC, responsible for space nuclear electric power
activities.

     Mr. Klein became associated with atomic energy work in 1946, when he
was employed by the Argonne National Laboratory. In 1950, he joined the
AEC's Chicago Operations Office as staff chemical engineer. Later, he was
promoted to Assistant Manager for Technical Operations.  Generally engaged
in reactor development work for stationary power plants, he had a primary
role in the power reactor demonstration program.

     Mr. Klein was born in St. Louis, Missouri. He served in the U.S.
Navy during World War II.

     He has a B S. degree in chemical engineering from Washington
University and a Master of Business Administration degree from Harvard
University.

     Mr. and Mrs. Klein and their three children live in Bethesda,
Maryland.

HANS M. MARK
NASA Ames Research Center

     Dr. Hans M. Mark, 40, Director of the NASA Ames Research Center,
Moffett Field, California, is a member of the APOLLO 13 Review
Board.

     Prior to being appointed Director of the Ames Research Center he was,
from 1964 to 1969, Chairman of the Department of Nuclear Engineering at
the University of California, Berkeley, California.

     An expert in nuclear and atomic physics, he served as Reactor
Administrator of the University of California's Berkeley Research Reactor,
professor of nuclear engineering and a research physicist at the
University's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California, and
consultant to the U.S. Army-and the National Science Foundation. He has
written many scientific papers.

     Except for 2 years as an Assistant Professor of Physics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1958 to 1960, Dr. Mark's
administrative, academic, and research career has been centered at the
University of California (Berkeley).

     Dr. Mark received his A.B. degree in physics from the University
of California, Berkeley, in 1951 and returned there as a research
physicist in 1955, one year after receiving his Ph. D. in physics
from M.I.T.

     He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and a member of the
American Geophysical Union, the American Society for Engineering Educa-
tion and the American Nuclear Society.

     Dr. Mark was born in Mannheim, Germany, and came to the United
States when he was 11 years old. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen
in 1945.

Dr. and Mrs. Mark are the Parents of two children.

COUNSEL TO THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD
GEORGE T. MALLEY
NASA Langley Research Center

     George T. Malley, 57, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center,
Hampton, Virginia, is the Legal Counsel to the Apollo 13 Review Board. He
also served as Counsel to the Apollo 204 Review Board.

     Mr. Malley is the Senior Field Counsel of NASA and has been assigned
to Langley since 1959. He was with the Office of the General Counsel,
Department of the Navy, from 1950 to 1959, where he specialized in
admiralty and international law.

     He is a retired Navy officer and served on active duty from 1939 to
1946, mainly in the South Pacific. His last assignment was commanding
officer of the U.S.S. Fentress.

     Mr. Malley has an A.B. degree from the University of Rochester and an
LL.B. degree from Cornell University Law School. He is a native of
Rochester, New York, and is a member of the New York Bar and the Federal
Bar Association.

     Mr. and Mrs. Malley and their two children live in Newport News,
Virginia.

MANNED SPACE FLIGHT TECHNICAL SUPPORT
CHARLES W. MATHEWS
NASA Headquarters

     Charles W. Mathews, 49, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., directs the Office of
Manned Space Flight technical support to the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Mr. Mathews has been a research engineer and project manager for NASA
and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), since 1943. In his present assignment, he serves as general
manager of manned space flight.

     Prior to his appointment to this position in 1968, he had been
Director, Apollo Applications Program, NASA Headquarters, since January
1967.

     Mr. Mathews was Gemini Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, from 1963 until 1967. Prior to that time, he was
Deputy Assistant Director for Engineering and Development and Chief of the
Spacecraft Technology Division at MSC.

     Mr. Mathews transferred to MSC (then the Space Task Group) when
Project Mercury became an official national program in 1958. He served as
Chief of the Operation Division. He had been at the Langley Research
Center, Hampton, Virginia, since 1943 engaged in aircraft flight research
and automatic control of airplanes. He became involved in manned space-
craft studies prior to the first Sputnik flights, and he conducted early
studies on reentry. Mr. Mathews was chairman of the group which developed
detailed specifications for the Mercury spacecraft.

     Mr. Mathews has been awarded the NASA Distinguished Service Medal and
the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal. He has received the NASA Group
Achievement Award - Gemini Program Team.

     He is a Fellow of the American Astronautical Society and an Associate
Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He is
the author of numerous technical articles published by NASA.

     Mr. Mathews, a native of Duluth, Minnesota, has a B S. degree in
aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy,
New York.

     Mr. and Mrs. Mathews live in Vienna, Virginia. They have two
children

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD OBSERVERS
WILLIAM A. ANDERS
National Aeronautics and Space Council

      William A. Anders, 36, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics
and Space Council, Washington, D.C., is an official observer of the
Apollo 13 Review Board.

      Prior to being appointed to his present position in 1969, Mr.  Anders
was a NASA astronaut and an Air Force lieutenant colonel. He was lunar
module pilot on the Apollo & lunar orbital mission, man's first visit to
the vicinity of another celestial body.

      Mr. Anders joined the NASA astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, in 1963. In addition to his Apollo 8 flight, he
served as backup pilot for Gemini 11 and backup command module pilot for
Apollo 11, the first lunar landing mission.

     Mr. Anders was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Force upon
graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. After flight training, he served
as a pilot in all-weather interceptor squadrons of the Air Defense
Command. Prior to becoming an astronaut, he was a nuclear engineer and
instructor pilot at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force
Base, New Mexico.

     He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and has been awarded
the Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Astronaut Wings, the NASA
Distinguished Service Medal, and the New York State Medal for Valor.

     Mr. Anders was born in Hong Kong. He received a B.S. degree from the
U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. degree in nuclear engineering from the Air
Force Institute of Technology.

Mr. and Mrs. Anders are the parents of five children.

CHARLES D. HARRINGTON
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc.

     Dr. Charles D Harrington, 59, President and General Manager,
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc., Richland, Washington, is an official
observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Dr. Harrington, who has been associated with all phases of the
chemical and nuclear industrial fields since 1941, is Chairman of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a statutory body created by
Congress.

     From 1941 to 1961, he was employed by the Mallinckrodt Chemical
Works, St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. Harrington started with the company as a
research chemist and in 1960, after a procession of research and
management positions, was appointed Vice President, Mallinckrodt Nuclear
Corporation and Vice President, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works.

     In 1961, when the fuel material processing plant of Mallinckrodt
became the Chemicals Division of United Nuclear Corporation, Dr.
Harrington was named Vice President of that division.

     He became Senior Vice President, United Nuclear Corporation,
Centreville, Maryland, in 1963.

     In 1965, Dr. Harrington was appointed President and General Manager,
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc. The company manages production reactors and
fuels fabrication facilities at Hanford, Washington, for the Atomic Energy
Commission.

     He is the co-author of a book, "Uranium Production Technology,"  and
has written numerous technical papers. He has received the Mid- West Award
of the American Chemical Society for contributions to technology in the
nuclear energy field.

     He is director of several corporations, including United Nuclear,
as well as Professional councils and societies.

     Dr. Harrington has M.S., M.A., and Ph. D. degrees in chemistry from
Harvard University.

I. IRVING PINKEL
NASA Lewis Research Center

     I. Irving Pinkel, 57, Director, Aerospace Safety Research and Data
Institute at the NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, is an
official observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Until recently, he directed research at Lewis Research Center on
rocket propellant and electric power generation systems for space
vehicles, compressors and turbines for advanced aircraft engines, and
lubrication systems for rotating machines for these systems.

     Mr. Pinkel entered Government scientific service in 1935 as a
physicist with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In
1940, he joined the staff of the Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia, as a physicist. When the Lewis Research Center was built in
1942, he transferred there.

     He has been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, honorary scientific
society, and Pi Mu Epsilon, honorary mathematics fraternity. He is an Ohio
Professional Engineer, served on the former NACA subcommittees on
Meteorological Problems, Icing Problems, Aircraft Fire Prevention and
Flight Safety, and is a member of the NASA Research and Technology Advi-
sory Subcommittee on Aircraft Operating Problems. He has been a Special
Lecturer, Case Institute of Technology Graduate School.

     Mr. Pinkel has received the Flight Safety Foundation Award for con-
tributions to the safe utilization of aircraft, the Laura Taber Barbour
Award for development of a system for suppressing aircraft crash fires,
the NACA Distinguished Service Medal, and the NASA Sustained Superior
Performance Award.

     He was born in Gloversville, New York, and was graduated from the
University of Pennsylvania.

     Mr. and Mrs. Pinkel live in Fairview Park, Ohio. They are the
parents of two sons.

JAMES E. WILSON, JR.

Committee on Science and Astronautics
United States House of Representatives

     James E. Wilson, Jr., 39, Technical Consultant, United States House
of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, is an official
observer of the Apollo 15 Review Board.

     Mr. Wilson has been technical consultant to the Committee since 1963.
From 1961 to 1963, he was Director of Research and Development, U.S. Naval
Propellant Plant, Indian Head, Maryland. Mr. Wilson managed the Polaris
Program at Indian Head from 1956 to 1961.

     From 1954 to 1956, Mr. Wilson served as an officer in the U.S.  Army
Signal Corps. He was a development engineer with E. I. DuPont, Wilmington,
Delaware, from 1953 to 1954.

     Mr. Wilson is a member of Phi Sigma Alpha, a National Honor Society;
American Institute of Chemical Engineers; American Chemical Society, and
American Ordnance Association.

     Mr. Wilson is co-author of several publications of the House Commit-
tee on Science and Astronautics.

     He received a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from the Univer-
sity of Maine and a Master of Engineering Administration degree from
George Washington University.

     Mr. and Mrs. Wilson live in LaPlata, Maryland. They have two
children.

APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD PANEL CHAIRMEN

SEYMOUR C. HIMMEL
NASA Lewis Research Center

     Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles,
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, heads the Design Panel of the
Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Dr. Himmel joined Lewis in 1948 as an aeronautical research scien-
tist. He has occupied supervisory positions since 1953.

     He has been awarded the NASA Exceptional Service Medal and the NASA
Group Achievement Award as manager of the Agena Project Group.  Dr. Himmel
has served on a number of advisory committees. He is an Associate Fellow
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member of
Tau Beta Pi and Pi Tau Sigma. He is the author of more than 25 technical
papers.

     Dr. Himmel has a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from the
College of the City of New York and M.S. and Ph. D. degrees from Case
Institute of Technology.

Dr. and Mrs. Himmel live in Lakewood, Ohio.

EDWIN C. KILGORE
NASA Langley Research Center

     Edwin C. Kilgore, 47, Deputy Chief, Engineering and Technical Serv-
ices, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, heads the Project
Management Panel of the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Mr. Kilgore joined the Langley science staff in 1944 and served in a
variety of technical and management positions until promotion to his
present position in 1968.

     He has received the Honorary Group Achievement Award for his role in
achieving a record of 97 consecutive successes for solid propellant rocket
motors and the NASA-Lunar Orbiter Project Group Achievement Award for
outstanding performance. He is a member of Pi Tau Sigma, honorary
mechanical engineering society.

     Mr. Kilgore was born in Coeburn, Virginia. He was graduated from
Virginia Polytechnic Institute with a B.S. degree in mechanical engi-
neering.

Mr. and Mrs. Kilgore and their two daughters live in Hampton.

HARRIS M. SCHURMEIER

California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory

     Harris M. Schurmeier, 45, Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for
Flight Projects, California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Lab-
oratory, Pasadena, California, heads the Manufacturing and Test Panel of
the Apollo 13 Review Board.

     Mr. Schurmeier was appointed to his current position in 1969.  Prior
to that he was Mariner Mars 1969 Project Manager, Voyager Capsule System
Manager and Deputy Manager of the Voyager Project, and Ranger Project
Manager at JPL.

     He has received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Scientific Achieve-
ment and Exceptional Service. In addition, he has received the Astro-
nautics Engineer Award, and the NASA Public Service Award.

     He was born in St. Paul, Minnesota. He has received a B.S. degree in
mechanical engineering, M.S. degree in aeronautical engineering, and a
professional degree in aeronautical engineering from the California
Institute of Technology.

     Mr. Schurmeier was a naval officer in World War II. He and his
wife and four children live in Altadena, California.

FRANCIS B. SMITH

NASA Headquarters

     Francis B. Smith, 47, Assistant Administrator for University Affairs,
NASA Headquarters, is leader of the Mission Events Panel of the Apollo 13
Review Board

     Mr. Smith has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to that
he had been Assistant Director, Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia, since 1964. He joined the Langley science staff in 1947. He is
an expert in several fields, including radio telemetry, radar, elec-
tronic tracking systems, and missile and range instrumentation.

     Mr. Smith was born in Piedmont, South Carolina, and received a B.S.
degree in electrical engineering from the University of South Carolina,
where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He remained at the University as
an instructor from 1943 to 1944 and then served in the U.S. Navy until
1946.

Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their three children live in Reston, Virginia.

PART 3. BOARD ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR
BOARD PANELS

BOARD ORGANIZATION

     After reviewing the scope of the Board's charter, the Chairman and
Board Members agreed upon the Panel and Support Office structure depicted
on the following organization chart. Each Panel was assigned specific
responsibilities for reviewing major elements of the overall Board task,
with particular emphasis upon establishing a sound and independent
technical data base upon which findings, determinations, and recommenda-
tions by the Board could be based. The Panels were staffed with in-
dividual NASA specialists and established working arrangements with the
Manned Space Flight line organization personnel working in analogous
areas.

     The Board's support offices were structured to provide necessary
staff, logistics, and administrative support without duplication of
available MSC assistance.

     In addition to this structure, the Board and Panels also utilized
the special assistance of expert consultants.

     Panel assignments, complete Panel membership, and the official Board
organization approved by the Chairman are included in this part of the
Board report.

GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR BOARD PANELS
(AS DOCUMENTED IN THE BOARD'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES)

Panel 1 - Mission Events Panel

     It shall be the task of the Mission Events Panel to provide a de-
tailed and accurate chronology of all pertinent events and actions leading
to, during, and subsequent to the Apollo 13 incident. This information, in
narrative and graphical time history form, will provide the Apollo 13
Review Board an official events record on which their analysis and
conclusions may be based. This record will be published in a form suitable
for inclusion in the Review Board's official report.

     The Panel will report all significant events derived from telemetry
records, air-to-ground communications transcripts, crew and control center
observations, and appropriate documents such as the flight plan, mission
technique description, Apollo Operation Handbook, and crew checklists.
Correlation between various events and other observations related to the
failure will be noted. Where telemetry data are referenced, the Panel will
comment as appropriate on its significance, reliability, accuracy, and on
spacecraft conditions which might have generated the data.

     The chronology will consist of three major sections' Preincident
Events, Incident Events, and Postincident Events. The decision-making
process leading to the safe recovery, referencing the relevant contin-
gency plans and available alternates, will be included.

     Preincident Events. - This section will chronicle the progress of
the flight from the countdown to the time of the incident. All action
and data relevant to the subsequent incident will be included.

     Incident Events. - This section will cover that period of time be-
ginning at 55 hours and 52 minutes after lift-off and continuing so long
as abnormal system behavior is relevant to the failure.

     Postincident Events. - This section will document the events and
activities subsequent to the incident and continuing to mission termina-
tion (Splash). Emphasis will be placed on the rationale used on mission
completion strategy.

Panel 1 Membership

     Mr. F. B. Smith, Panel Chairman
     Assistant Administrator for University Affairs
     NASA Headquarters
     Washington, D. C.

     Dr. Tom B. Ballard
     Aerospace Technologist
     Flight Instrument Division
     Langley Research Center
     Hampton, Virginia

     Mr. M. P. Frank
     Flight Director
     Flight Control Division
     Manned Spacecraft Center
     Houston, Texas

     Mr. John J. Williams
     Director, Spacecraft Operations
     Kennedy Space Center
     Florida

     Mr. Neil Armstrong, Board Member and Panel Monitor
     Astronaut
     Manned Spacecraft Center
     Houston, Texas

Panel 2 - Manufacturing and Test Panel

     The Manufacturing sad Test Panel shall review the manufacturing and
testing, including the associated reliability and quality assurance
activities, of the flight hardware components involved in the flight
failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the analysis
of the design. The purpose of this review is to ascertain the adequacy of
the manufacturing procedures, including any modifications, and the pre-
flight test and checkout program, and any possible correlation of these
activities with the inflight events.

The Panel shall consist of three activities:

     Fabrication and Acceptance Testing - This will consist of reviewing
the fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing steps actually used
during the manufacturing of the specific flight hardware elements in-
volved. Fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing procedures and
records will be reviewed, as well as observation of actual operations when
appropriate.

     Subsystem and System Testing - This will consist of reviewing all the
flight qualification testing from the completion of the component-level
acceptance testing up through the countdown to lift-off for the specific
hardware involved. Test procedures and results will be reviewed as well as
observing specific tests where appropriate. Results of tests on other
serial number units will also be reviewed when appropriate.

     Reliability and Quality Assurance - This will be an overview of both
the manufacturing and testing, covering such things as parts and material
qualification and control, assembly and testing procedures, and inspection
and problem/failure reporting and closeout.

Panel 2 Membership

Mr. Harris M. Schurmeier, Panel Chairman
Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena. California

Mr. Edward F. Baehr
Assistant Chief, Launch Vehicles Division
Deputy Manager, Titan Project
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

Mr. Karl L. Heimburg
Director, Astronautics Laboratory
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama

Mr. Brooks T. Morris
Manager, Quality Assurance and Reliability Office
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena, California

Dr. John F. Clark, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Director
Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland

Panel 3 - Design Panel

     The Design Panel shall examine the design of the oxygen and asso-
ciated systems to the extent necessary to support the theory of failure.
After such review the Panel shall indicate a course of corrective action
which shall include requirements for further investigations and/or re-
design. In addition, the Panel shall establish requirements for review of
other Apollo spacecraft systems of similar design.

The Panel shall consist of four subdivisions:

     Design Evaluation - This activity shall review the requirements and
specifications governing the design of the systems, subsystems and com-
ponents, their derivation, changes thereto and the reasons therefore, and
the design of the system in response to the requirements, including such
elements as design approach, material selection, stress analysis, de-
velopment and qualification test programs, and results. This activity
shall also review and evaluate proposed design modifications, including
changes in operating procedures required by such modifications.

     Failure Modes and Mechanisms - This activity shall review the design
of the systems to ascertain the possible sources of failure and the manner
in which failures may occur. In this process, they shall attempt to
correlate such modes with the evidence from flight and ground test data.
This shall include considerations such as: energy sources, materials
compatibility, nature of pressure vessel failure, effects of environment
and service, the service history of any suspect systems and components,
and any degradation that may have occurred.

     Electrical - This activity shall review the design of all electrical
components associated with the theory of failure to ascertain their
adequacy. This activity shall also review and evaluate proposed design
modifications, including changes in operating-procedures required by such
modifications.

     Related Systems - This activity shall review the design of all
systems similar to that involved in the Apollo 13 incident with the view
to establishing any commonality of design that may indicate a need for
redesign. They shall also consider the possibility of design modifica-
tions to Permit damage containment in the event of a failure.

Panel 3 Membership

Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Panel Chairman
Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

Mr. William F. Browns Jr.
Chief, Strength of Materials Branch
Materials and Structures Division
Administration Directorate
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

Mr. R. N. Lindley
Special Assistant to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

Dr. William R. Lucas
Director, Program Development
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama

Mr. J. F. Saunders, Jr.
Project Officer for Command and Service Module
Office of Manned Space Flight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Robert C. Wells
Head, Electric Flight Systems Section
Vehicles Branch
Flight Vehicles and Systems Division
Office of Engineering and Technical Services
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

Mr. Vincent L. Johnson, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Deputy Associate Administrator for Engineering
Office of Space Science and Applications
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.

Panel 4 - Project Management Panel

The Project Management Panel will undertake the following tasks:

     1. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management struc-
ture employed in Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13
incident. This review will encompass the organization, the responsi-
bilities of organizational elements and the adequacy of the staffing.

     2. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management systems
employed on Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13 incident.
This task will include the management systems employed to control the
appropriate design, manufacturing, and test operations; the processes used
to assure adequate communications between organizational elements; the
processes used to control hardware and functional interfaces; the safety
processes involved; and protective security.

3. Review the project management lessons learned from the Apollo
13 mission from the standpoint of their applicability to subsequent
Apollo missions.

     Tasks 1 and 2, above, should encompass both the general review of the
processes used in Apollo 13 and specific applicability to the possible
cause or causes of the mission incident as identified by the Board.

Panel 4 Membership

E. C. Kilgore, Panel Chairman
Deputy Chief, Office of Engineering and Technical Services
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

R. D. Ginter
Director of Special Programs Office
Office of Advanced Research and Technology
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C.

Merrill H. Mead
Chief of Programs and Resources Office
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California

James B. Whitten
Assistant Chief, Aeronautical and Space Mechanics Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

Milton Klein, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office
Washington, D.C.

Board Observers

William A. Anders
Executive Secretary
National Aeronautics and Space Council
Washington, D.C.

Dr. Charles D. Harrington
Chairman
NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Washington, D.C.

I. Irving Pinkel
Director
Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio

Mr. James E. Wilson
Technical Consultant to the Committee on Science and Astronautics
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Apollo 13 Review Board Support Staff

Brian M. Duff
Public Affairs Officer
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas

Gerald J. Mossinghoff
Director of Congressional Liaison
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C.

Edward F. Parry
Counsel to Office of Manned Space Flight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C.

Raymond G. Romatowski
Deputy Assistant Director for Administration
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

Ernest P. Swieda
Deputy Chief, Skylab Program Control Office
Kennedy Space Center, Florida

Consultants to the Board

Dr. Wayne D. Erickson, Head
Aerothermochemistry Branch
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia

Dr. Robert Van Dolah
Acting Research Director
Safety Research Center
Bureau of Mines
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

MSC Support to the Board

     These persons were detailed by MSC to support the Apollo 13 Review
Board during its review activity at MSC. They are identified by MSC
Position title.

Roy C. Aldridge
Assistant to the Director of Administration

Mary Chandler
Secretary

Rex Cline
Technical Writer/Editor

Evon Collins
Program Analyst

Leroy Cotton
Equipment Specialist

Maureen Cruz
Travel Clerk

Janet Harris
Clerk Stenographer

Marjorie Harrison
Secretary

Phyllis Hayes
Secretary

William N. Henderson
Management Analyst

Sharon Laws
Secretary

Carolyn Lisenbee
Secretary

Judy Miller
Secretary

Jamie Moon
Technical Editor

Dorothy Newberry
Administrative Assistant

Lettie Reed
Editorial Assistant

Charlene Rogozinski
Secretary

Joanne Sanchez
Secretary

Billie Schmidt
Employee Development Specialist

Frances Smith
Secretary

George Sowers

Management Presentations Officer

Elaine Stemerick
Secretary

2-26
Mary Thompson
Administrative Assistant

Alvin C. Zuehlke
Electrical Engineer

PART 4. SUMMARY OF BOARD ACTIVITIES

APRIL 19, 1970

     Chairman E. M. Cortright met with Langley officials to begin planning
the Apollo 13 Review Board approach. Tentative list of Panel Members and
other specialists were developed for consideration.

APRIL 20, 1970

     Chairman Cortright met with the NASA Administrator, Deputy Adminis-
trator, and key NASA officials in Washington, D.C., to discuss Board
membership.

     The Chairman met with NASA Office of Manned Space Flight top offi-
cials while enroute to MSC on NASA aircraft and discussed program organi-
zation plans for review of the accident, and coordination with Apollo 13
Review Board activity.

APRIL 21, 1970

     Chairman Cortright met with MSC officials to discuss Apollo 13 Review
Board support.

     A formal MSC debriefing of the Apollo 13 crew was conducted for MSC
officials and Apollo 13 Review Board personnel already at MSC.

     Detailed discussions between early arrivals on the Review Board and
the MSC Investigation Team were held to provide quick-look data on the
Apollo 13 accident and to develop detailed procedures for MSC support of
the Apollo 13 Board.

     Chairman Cortright met with members of the Press to report on early
activity of the Board and to inform them of plans for keeping the Press
current on Board activities.

     The first meeting of the Board was held at 8 p.m. to discuss Board
composition, structure, assignments, and scope of review.  Preliminary
plans were developed for appointing various specialists to assist the
Board in its analysis and evaluation.

APRIL 22, 1970

     The Board met with Colonel McDivittts MSC Investigation Team to re-
view the progress made by MSC in identifying causes of the accident and in
developing an understanding of sequences and relationships between known
inflight events. In addition, MSC officials briefed the Board on MSC
Investigation Team structure and assignments.

     The Board met with Panel 1 of the MSC Investigation Team for de-
tailed discussion of inflight events and consideration of early con-
clusions on implications of preliminary data analysis.

     The Board held its second meeting to discuss MSC investigative
efforts and additional appointments of Panel specialists.

     Board members attended Panel 1 evening roundup of day's evaluation
activities, which included detailed discussions of specific studies, data
reductions, and support test activities already underway.

APRIL 23, 1970

     The Apollo 15 Review Board established itself in proximity to the MSC
Investigation Team in Building 45, and arranged for all administrative
and logistics support to the Board.

     A daily schedule of meetings, reviews, briefings, and discussions
was established, including preliminary plans for contractor meetings,
special support tests, and accumulation of accident-related
information.

     Initial task assignments and responsibilities were made to Board
Panels as guidance for detailed review work.  Individual Board members were
assigned Panel overview responsibilities or other special tasks.

     Administrative procedures were developed for Board activity, par-
ticularly to provide efficient interface with MSC personnel.

     Board and Panel Members again met with MSC officials to further re-
view the sequence of events in the Apollo 15 mission and to examine early
hypotheses concerning causes of these events.

     The Board convened for an evening meeting to discuss the progress to
date and to coordinate Panel activities for the next few days.  Discussion
centered upon immediate requirements for data collection and analysis.

     Chairman Cortright appointed additional NASA specialists in order to
bring Panels up to strength.

APRIL 24, 1970

     Board Members, Panel Chairmen, and MSC officials reviewed additional
data analysis made by MSC and contractor personnel with particular empha-
sis upon the service module (SM) cryogenic system.

     The Board convened and reviewed the progress to date. Tentative
approvals were given for Board trips to North American Rockwell (NR),
Downey, California, Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, and other loca-
tions.

Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on progress to date.

     Panel Chairmen and Members continued their detailed analysis of
failure modes, test histories, mission events, and other data bearing
upon the accident.

     Board Members and Panel Chairmen met with Mr. Norman Ryker of NR on
NR's activities involving design, qualification, and tests of SM cryo-
genic oxygen tanks.

APRIL 25, 1970

     The Board met to discuss details of onsite inspections of command
service module (CSM) flight hardware at principal contractor installa-
tions.

     Panels examined in detail probable failure modes based on data
analyzed at that time.

     Specific plans were discussed by the Board relating to evaluation of
oxygen tank assembly and checkout operations, including review of
component histories.

     The MSC Investigation Team members briefed Board Personnel on Kennedy
Space Center checkout operations of the service module cryogenic and
electric power systems, including a detailed briefing covering oxygen tank
detanking operations.

APRIL 26, 1970

     Board and Panel Members traveled to North American Rockwell, Downey,
for detailed briefings by NR engineers and management. NR reviewed its
progress in an intensive analysis of the Apollo 13 malfunction, including
a review of approved special tests. Oxygen tank, fuel cell components,
assemblies and other hardware were also inspected.

APRIL 27, 1970

     An Executive Session of the Board met to discuss progress of specific
analyses required to verify tentative conclusions on oxygen tank failure
and service module EPS failure.

     Additional Board specialists arrived at MSC and received detailed
briefings by MSC and Board personnel on selected aspects of the Apollo 13
data.

     Panel Members received and assessed a preliminary MSC evaluation of
the Apollo 13 accident, including tentative conclusions on the most
probable failure modes.

     Procedures were established to provide information flow on the status
of review to Board observers.

     The Board reviewed work plans for the coming week with each Panel and
established review priorities and special task assignments.

APRIL 28, 1970

     Chairman Cortright outlined a plan for the Board's preliminary report
scheduled for presentation to the Deputy Administrator during his visit to
MSC on May 1. Each Panel Chairman was to summarize the status of his
Panel's activities for Dr. George Low on Friday, April 29, 1970.

     Board Member Neil Armstrong completed arrangements to provide each
Board Member and Panel Chairman an opportunity for detailed simulation of
the Apollo 13 inflight accident using MSC's CSM simulation equipment.

     Board and Panel Members reviewed enhanced photographs of the
Apollo 13 service module at the MSC Photographic Laboratory.

     Dr. von Elbe of Atlantic Research Company briefed Board and Panel
Members on cryogenics and combustion phenomena.

     A representative of the Manufacturing and Test Panel performed an
onsite inspection at Beech Aircraft, Boulder.

     Manufacture and Test Panel-personnel reviewed detanking procedures
followed at KSC during the Apollo 13 countdown demonstration test (CDDT).

     Board and Panel personnel reviewed progress to date at a general
Board meeting involving all Review Board personnel.

APRIL 29, 1970

     Dr. Charles Harrington, Board Observer and Chairman of the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, arrived for a 2-day detailed review of Board pro-
cedures and Progress in the accident review.

     The Board reviewed North American Rockwell preliminary recommenda-
tions involving oxygen tank redesign.

     The Board continued to review and examine oxygen tank ignition
sources and combustion propagation processes with specialists from MSC,
other NASA Centers, and contractor personnel.

     The Mission Events Panel continued to examine and record details of
all significant mission events as a basis for other Panel evaluations and
study.

     Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review Panel pro-
gress to date and to discuss work plans for the next several days.

     The Project Management Panel visited North American Rockwell at
Downey to review detailed procedures for acceptance tests, subcontractor
inspections, project documentation, and other management interface areas.

APRIL 30, 1970

     The Safety Advisory Panel continued discussions with Board Chairman
and MSC officials on progress of total Apollo 13 review efforts.

     Panel Members reviewed instrumentation used in Apollo 13 spacecraft
in order to establish the validity of telemetry data being used in Board
analysis.

     Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review progress of
the work and to discuss preliminary findings of the Board.

     Project Management personnel visited Beech Aircraft Corporation to
review procedures used for assembly of cryogenic oxygen tanks and to dis-
cuss communication and information systems within the APOLLO Program.

Panels continued to review detailed data in their respective areas.

MAY 1, 1970

     Board and Panel personnel participated in a joint MSC/Apollo 13
Review Board status presentation to the NASA Deputy Administrator.  The
meeting covered all significant Apollo 13 findings and early conclusions
on the cause of the accident and appropriate remedial actions.

     The MSC staff briefed Board Members on initiaI evaluations of pro-
posed design changes in oxygen tank system.

     Panel Members continued to assess data accumulated from the Apollo 13
mission with particular emphasis upon the design and performance of elec-
tric power systems used in the service module.

     Board Members and Panel Chairmen reviewed specific test matrix being
proposed by Apollo 13 Review Board specialists covering most significant
unknowns involved in understanding failure mechanisms.

MAY 2, 1970

     Board Members met in General Session to discuss preparation of a com-
plete "failure tree" as an additional guide in conducting a complete re-
view and investigation. Specific aspects of this approach were reviewed.

     The Project Management Panel reviewed oxygen tank reliability history
and quality assurance criteria used in assembly, test, and checkout of
these systems.

     Panel specialists continued reviewing data from the mission with
emphasis upon integrating various data points into logical failure mode
patterns established by MSC and Board personnel.

MAY 3 1970

     Chairman Cortright and Board Members conducted a detailed review of
individual Panel status and progress and established milestones for
additional analytical work and preparation of preliminary findings.

     The Board and Panel agreed to tentative report structure, including
required exhibits, tables, drawings, and other reference data.

     The Board established a system for tabulating all significant mission
events and explanatory data, including the support tests required to
clarify questions raised by events.

     Panel Members worked on individual analyses with particular attention
to developing requirements for additional test activity in support of ten-
tative conclusions.

     The Board agreed to strengthen its technical reviews of combustion
propagation and electrical design by adding specialists in these areas.

MAY 4, 1970

     The Design Panel continued its intensive review of the "shelf drop"
incident at NR involving the cryogenic oxygen flight tank used in
Apollo 13 in order to understand possible results of this event.

     The Mission Events Panel continued to analyze telemetry data received
by MSC, with particular attention on data received in proximity to the
data dropout period during the Apollo 13 mission and on fan turnons during
the flight.

     The Board transmitted a formal listing of 62 requests for data,
analyses, and support tests required for Board review activity.

The Board continued to meet with individual Panels and support
offices to review the status of preliminary findings and work
completed.

MAY 5, 1970

     The Board met in General Session to discuss the scope and conduct of
support test activity, including careful documentation of test methods and
application of test results.

     MSC personnel briefed Panel Members on availability of additional
telemetry data in the MSC data bank in order to insure Board considera-
tion of all possible useful data.

     Panels commenced initial drafting of preliminary findings in specific
areas, including summary descriptions of system performance during the
Apollo 13 flight.

     The Board met with the MSC Investigation Team for complete review of
the proposed test program.

MAY 6, 1970

     Board Members, MSC personnel, and Members of NASA's Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel met for detailed discussions and evaluation of accident
review status and progress. The review covered oxygen tank questions,
recovery operations, and a mission simulation by MSC astronauts.

     Panel Members continued to work on the preparation of preliminary
Panel drafts.

     Chairman Cortright transmitted additional requests for tests to MSC
and modified procedures for control of overall test activity relating to
the Apollo 13 accident.

MAY 7, 1970

     The General Board Session reviewed complete analysis and test support
activities being conducted for the Board and MSC at various governmental
and contractor installations.

     Board and Panel Members met to discuss Ames laboratory tests con-
cerning liquid oxygen combustion initiation energies required in the
cryogenic oxygen tank used in the Apollo 13 SM.

     Panel 1 Members reviewed mission control equipment and operating
procedures used during the Apollo 13 mission and reviewed actual mission
events in detail.

     The Panels continued to develop preliminary drafts of their reviews
and analyses for consideration by the Board.

MAY 8, 1970

     Dr. Robert Van Dolah, Bureau of Mines, joined the Board as a con-
sultant on combustion propagation and reviewed Apollo 13 Review Board data
developed to date.

     The General Board Session convened to review proposed report format
and scope. An agreement was reached on appendices, on the structure of the
report, and on the degree of detail to be included in individual Panel
reports.

     Chairman Cortright assigned additional specific test overview re-
sponsibilities to members of the Apollo 13 Review activity.

     Panel 1 conducted a formal-interview with the MSC Flight Director
covering all significant mission events from the standpoint of ground
controllers.

     Panels 2 through 4 continued developing preliminary reports.  Panel 4
announced a formal schedule of interviews of MSC, contractors, and NASA
Headquarters personnel.

     Board Members explored in detail possible failure mode sequences
developed by MSC personnel involving ignition and combustion within the SM
cryogenic oxygen tank.

     The Board recessed for 3 days, leaving a cadre of personnel at MSC to
edit preliminary drafts developed by the Panels and to schedule further
activity for the week of May 11.

MAY 9, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY 10, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY 11, 1970

     Board in recess. MSC support personnel continued work obtaining
additional technical data for Board review.

MAY 12, 1970

Board Members returned to MSC.

     Board Members attended a General Session to review progress and
status of the report.

     Panel Chairmen reported on individual progress of work and estab-
lished schedules for completion of analyses and evaluations.

     Chairman Cortright reported on the Langley Research Center support
test program aimed at simulation of SM panel ejection energy pulses.

MAY 13, 1970

     Board Members reviewed preliminary drafts of report chapter on Re-
view and Analysis and Panel 1 report on Mission Events.

     Mission Events Panel Members interviewed Electrical, Electronic, and
Communications Engineer (EECOM) and one of the Apollo 13 Flight Directors
on activities which took place in the Mission Control Center (MCC) during
and after the flight accident period.

     Panel 4, Project Management Panel, conducted interviews with princi-
pal Apollo 13 program personnel from MSC and contract organizations.

     Panel Members continued drafting preliminary versions of Panel re-
ports for review by the Board.

     Manufacturing and Test Panel representatives discussed program for
oxygen tank testing to be conducted at Beech Aircraft.

     Board Members met in General Session to review report milestones and
required test data for the week ahead.

MAY 14, 1970

     Board met in General Session to review Panel report progress and to
agree to firm schedules for completion of all Review Board assignments.

     Project Management Panel continued to interview key Apollo project
personnel from NASA Centers and contractors.

     Panel Members circulated first drafts of all Panel reports to Board
Members for review and correction.

MAY 15, 1970

     Mission Events Panel personnel interviewed Apollo 13 Command Module
Pilot John Swigert to verify event chronology compiled by the Panel and to
review crew responses during Apollo 13 mission.

     Project Management Panel continued interviewing key project personnel
with NASA Centers and contractors.

     MSC personnel provide Board Members and Panel Chairmen with a
detailed briefing on all support tests and analyses being performed in
connection with the MSC and Board reviews.

     Board Members met in Executive Session to review preliminary drafts
of Panel reports and findings and determinations and to provide additional
instructions and guidance to Panel Chairmen.

     Panel Members continued to review and edit early Panel drafts and to
compile reference data in support of findings.

MAY 16, 1970

     Board met in General Session to review further revisions of
preliminary findings and determinations and to establish working schedules
for completion of the Board report.

     Panel Members continued to edit and refine Panel reports on basis of
discussions with MSC personnel and further analysis of Apollo 13
documentation.

MAY 17, 1970

     Draft material for all parts of Board report was reviewed by Panel
Members and staff. Changes were incorporated in all draft material and
recirculated for additional review and comment.

     Board Members met in General Session to review report progress and to
examine results from recent support tests and analyses being conducted at
various Government and contractor installations.

     The Apollo 13 Review Board discussed a continuing series of support
tests for recommendation to MSC following presentation of report and
recess of the Board.

MAY 18, 1970

     Board Members reviewed Special Tests and Analyses Appendix of the
report and examined results of completed tests.

     Board met in General Session to discuss control-procedures for
reproduction and distribution of Board report.

     Mission Events Panel distributed a final draft of their report for
review by Board Members.

     Board reviewed a preliminary draft of findings and determinations
prepared by Panel Chairmen, Board Members, and Board Chairman.

     A Manufacture and Test Panel representative reviewed special oxygen
tank test programs at Beech Aircraft.

MAY 19. 1970

     Board Members met in Executive Session to continue evaluation and
assessment of preliminary findings, determinations, and recommendations
prepared by individual Board Members and Panel Chairmen.

     Board met in General Session to review final draft of Mission Events
Panel report.

     Manufacture and Test Panel preliminary report was distributed to
Board Members for review and comment.

     Design Panel preliminary report was distributed to Board Members for
review and comment.

     Design Panel Members met with MSC Team officials to discuss further
test and analyses support for the Board.

MAY 20, 1970

     Board Members met in Executive Session to review and evaluate reports
from the Design Panel and from the Manufacturing and Test Panel.

     Project Management Panel distributed final draft of its report to
Board Members for review and comment.

     Chairman Cortright met with Mr. Bruce Lundin of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel to discuss progress of Board review and analysis.

MAY 21, 1970

     Board Members met in Executive Session for final review of Project
Management Panel report.

     Board Members and others met with MSC officials to review in detail
the activities and actions taken after the Apollo 204 accident concerning
ignition flammability for materials and control in the CSM.

     A third draft of preliminary findings, determinations, and recommen-
dations was developed and circulated by the Chairman for review and
comment.

     Arrangements were made with NASA Headquarters officials for pack-
aging, delivery, and distribution of the Board's final report.

     Mission Events Panel conducted an interview with Lunar Module Pilot
IIaise to review selected mission events bearing on the accident.

MAY 22, 1970

     Mission Events Panel representatives met with MSC officials to review
in detail several events which occurred during later flight stages.

     Board met in Executive Session to assess latest drafts of findings,
determinations, and recommendations circulated by the Chairman.

     Board met in General Session to review total progress in all report
areas and to establish final schedule for preparation of Board report.

     Langley Research Center representative M. Ellis briefed the Board on
ignition and combustion of materials in oxygen atmosphere tests being con-
ducted in support of the Apollo 15 Review.

     Board Observer I. I. Pinkel briefed the Board on Lewis Research
Center fire propagation tests involving Teflon.

MAY 23, 1970

     Board Members reviewed Chapter 4 of Board report entitled "Review and
Analysis."

     Panel Chairmen reviewed draft findings and determinations prepared by
the Board.

MAY 24, 1970

     Board Members reviewed NASA Aerospace Safety Panel report covering
Apollo activities during the period of 1968-69.

     Board met in Executive Session for detailed review of support test
status and progress and of documentation describing the results of test
activity.

     Board met in Executive Session for further review of findings,
determinations and recommendations.

MAY 25, 1970

     Board met in Executive Session to review test progress and decided
to postpone submittal of final report until June 8 in order to consider
results of Langley Research Center panel ejection tests.

     Board Members continued to review MSC Investigation Team
preliminary drafts and refine Apollo 13 data in the various Board
appendices.

     Board met in Executive Session for further consideration of findings,
determinations, and recommendations.

MAY 26, 1970

     Board met in General Session and interviewed Astronaut James Lovell
regarding crew understanding of inflight accident.

     Board Members reviewed proposed MSC tank combustion test and agreed
to test methodology and objectives.

Panel Members continued preparation of individual Panel reports.

MAY 27, 1970

     Board and Panel Members received a detailed briefing on thermostatic
switch failure during MSC heater tube temperature tests.

     Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel met with Chairman Cortright, Board
Members, and Panel Chairmen to review Board progress and status of
findings and conclusions.

     Board met in General Session to review status of Panel reports,
documentation of test data and results, and plans for report typing and
review.

     Board agreed to recess for several days to accumulate additional
test information on panel separation and full scale tank ignition data.

MAY 28, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY 29, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY 30, 1970

Board in recess.

MAY 31, 1970

Board in recess.

JUNE 1, 1970

Board Members returned to MSC.

     Board and Panel Members met in General Session to discuss revisions
of Panel reports in light of latest information regarding thermostatic
switch failure during CDDT at KSC.

     Board approved new schedule for Board report calling for final
versions of Panel reports by Monday, June 8.

JUNE 2, 1970

     Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on the status of the Board's
work and future plans.

     Board and Panel Members participated in a detailed interview and
discussion with MSC and contractor personnel regarding specific coordina-
tion steps taken during oxygen tank no. 2 detanking operations at KSC.

     Board Members met in Executive Session to review latest test results
and to assess status of Board findings and determinations.

JUNE 3, 1970

     Board and Panel Members met with MSC Program Office personnel for a
detailed update of recent MSC information and analyses stemming from on-
going test programs.

     Board Members and Panel Chairmen completed final reviews of Panel
reports and also reviewed final draft of findings, determinations, and
recommendations.

     Board and Panel Members received a detailed briefing on thermostatic
switch questions with emphasis upon actions of various organizations
during and after detanking operations at KSC.

JUNE 4, 1970

     Board Members met in Executive Session and completed final revisions
of Chapter 4 of the Board summary.

     Board and Panel Members witnessed a special full-scale tank ignition
test performed at MSC.

     Panel Chairmen completed final revisions of individual Panel reports
and submitted copy to the Reports Editorial Office.

     Board met in Executive Session and agreed to final schedule for re-
port printing and delivery to the Administrator on June 15, 1970.

JUNE 5, 1970

     Board Members met in Executive Session and completed work on Chap-
ter 5 of the Board Summary Report (Findings, Determinations, and Recom-
mendations).

     Board Members reviewed final version of Project Management Panel
report and authorized printing as Appendix E.

     Board Members Hedrick and Mark completed final tabulation of test
support activities performed for the Board.

     Board Members reviewed films of special test activities performed
at various NASA Centers.

JUNE 6, 1970

     Board met in Executive Session throughout the day and completed
its review of Chapter 5 of its report (Findings, Determinations, and
Recommendations).

     Board Members completed review of analyses to be incorporated in
Appendix F, Special Tests and Analyses.

JUNE 7, 1970

     The Board met in Executive Session and approved plans and schedules
for final editorial review and publication of the Board report.

     The Chairman recessed the Board until June 15 at which time the
Board is scheduled to reconvene in Washington, D.C., to present its
report to the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator.

CHAPTER 3
DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE
AND MISSION SUMMARY

     This chapter is extracted from Mission Operation Report No. M-932-70,
Revision 3, published by the Program and Special Reports Division (XP),
Executive Secretariat, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

     Discussion in this chapter is broken into two parts. Part l is
designed to acquaint the reader with the flight hardware and with the
mission monitoring, support, and control functions and capabilities. Part
2 describes the Apollo 13 mission and gives a mission sequence of events
summary.

PART 1 APOLLO/SATURN V SPACE VEHICLE

     The primary flight hardware of the Apollo Program consists of the
Saturn V launch vehicle and Apollo spacecraft (fig. 3-1). Collectively,
they are designated the Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle (SV). Selected major
systems and subsystems of the space vehicle may be summarized as follows.

SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE

     The Saturn V launch vehicle (LV) is designed to boost up to 300,000
pounds into a 105-nautical mile earth orbit and to provide for lunar
payloads of over 100,000 pounds. The Saturn V LV consists of three
propulsive stages (S-IC, S-II, S-IVB), two interstages, and an instrument
unit (IU).

S-IC Stage

     The S-IC stage (fig. 3-2) is a large cylindrical booster, 138 feet
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant F-1 rocket
engines. These engines develop a nominal sea level thrust total of
approximately 7,650,000 pounds. The stage dry weight is approximately
288,000 pounds and the total loaded stage weight is approximately
5,031,500 pounds. The S-IC stage interfaces structurally and electri-
cally with the S-II stage. It also interfaces structurally, elec-
trically, and pneumatically with ground support equipment (GSE) through
two umbilical service arms, three tail service masts, and certain
electronic systems by antennas. The S-IC stage is instrumented for
operational measurements or signals which are transmitted by its inde-
pendent telemetry system.

S-II Stage

     The S-II stage (fig. 3-3) is a large cylindrical booster, 81.5 feet
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant J-2 rocket
engines which develop a nominal vacuum thrust of 230,000 pounds each for a
total of 1,150,000 pounds. Dry weight of the S-II stage is approximately
78,050 pounds. The stage approximate loaded gross weight is 1,075,000
pounds. The S-IC/S-II interstage weighs 10,460 pounds. The S-II stage is
instrumented for operational and research and development measurements
which are transmitted by its independent telemetry system. The S-II stage
has structural and electrical interfaces with the S-IC and S-IVB stages,
and electric, pneumatic, and fluid interfaces with GSE through its
umbilicals and antennas.

S-IVB Stage

     The S-IVB stage (fig. 3-4) is a large cylindrical booster 59 feet
long and 21.6 feet in diameter, powered by one J-2 engine. The S-IVB
stage is capable of multiple engine starts. Engine thrust is 203,000
pounds. This stage is also unique in that it has an attitude control
capability independent of its main engine. Dry weight of the stage is
25,050 pounds. The launch weight of the stage is 261,700 pounds. The
interstage weight of 8100 pounds is not included-in the stated weights.
The stage is instrumented for functional measurements or signals which
are transmitted by its independent telemetry system.

     The high performance J-2 engine as installed in the S-IVB stage has a
multiple start capability. The S-IVB J-2 engine is scheduled to produce a
thrust of 203,000 pounds during its first burn to earth orbit and a thrust
of 178,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of h.5:1) during the first 100
seconds of translunar injection. The remaining translunar injection
acceleration is provided at a thrust level of 203,000 pounds (mixture mass
ratio of 5.0:1). The engine valves are controlled by a pneumatic system
powered by gaseous helium which is stored in a sphere inside a start
bottle. An electrical control system that uses solid stage logic elements
is used to sequence the start and shutdown operations of the engine.

Instrument Unit

     The Saturn V launch vehicle is guided from its launch pad into earth
orbit primarily by navigation, guidance, and control equipment located in
the instrument unit (IU). The instrument unit is a cylindrical structure
21.6 feet in diameter and 3 feet high installed on top of the S-IVB stage.
The unit weighs 4310 pounds and contains measurements and telemetry,
command communications, tracking, and emergency detection system
components along with supporting electrical power and the environmental
control system.

APOLLO SPACECRAFT

     The Apollo spacecraft (S/C) is designed to support three men in space
for periods up to 2 weeks, docking in space, landing on and returning from
the lunar surface, and safely entering the earth's atmosphere.  The Apollo
S/C consists of the spacecraft-to-LM adapter (SLA), the service module
(SM), the command module (CM), the launch escape system (LES), and the
lunar module (LM). The CM and SM as a unit are referred to as the command
and service module (CSM).

Spacecraft-to-LM Adapter

     The SLA (fig. 3-5) is a conical structure which provides a structural
load path between the LV and SM and also supports the LM.  Aerodynami-
cally, the SLA smoothly encloses the irregularly shaped LM and transitions
the space vehicle diameter from that of the upper stage of the LV to that
of the SM. The SLA also encloses the nozzle of the SM engine and the high
gain antenna.

     Spring thrusters are used to separate the LM from the SLA. After the
CSM has docked with the LM, mild charges are fired to release the four
adapters-which secure the LM in the SLA. Simultaneously, four spring
thrusters mounted on the lower (fixed) SLA panels push against the LM
landing gear truss assembly to separate the spacecraft from the launch
vehicle.

Service Module

     The service module (SM) (fig. 3-6) provides the main spacecraft pro-
pulsion and maneuvering capability during a mission. The SM provides most
of the spacecraft consumables (oxygen, water, propellant, and hydrogen)
and supplements environmental, electrical power, and propulsion
requirements of the CM. The SM remains attached to the CM until it is
jettisoned just before CM atmospheric entry.

     Structure.- The basic structural components are forward and aft
(upper and lower) bulkheads, six radial beams, four sector honeycomb
panels, four reaction control system honeycomb panels, aft heat shield,
and a fairing.  The forward and aft bulkheads cover the top and bottom of
the SM.  Radial beam trusses extending above the forward bulkhead support
an secure the CM.  The radial beams are made of solid aluminum alloy which
has been machined and chem-milled to thicknesses varying between 2 inches
and 0.018 inch.  Three of these beams have compression pads and the other
three have shear-compression pads and tension ties.  Explosive charges in
the center section of these tension ties are used to separate the CM from
the SM.

     An aft heat shield surrounds the service propulsion engine to protect
the SM from the engine's heat during thrusting. The gap between the CM and
the forward bulkhead of the SM is closed off with a fairing which is
composed of eight electrical power system radiators alternated with eight
aluminum honeycomb panels. The sector and reaction control system panels
are 1 inch thick and are made of aluminum honeycomb core between two
aluminum face sheets. The sector panels are bolted to the radial beams.
Radiators used to dissipate heat from the environmental control subsystem
are bonded to the sector panels on opposite sides of the SM. These
radiators are each about 30 square feet in area.

     The SM interior is divided into six sectors, or bays, and a center
section. Sector one is currently void. It is available for installation of
scientific or additional equipment should the need arise. Sector two has
part of a space radiator and a reaction control system (RCS) engine quad
(module) on its exterior panel and contains the service propulsion
system (SPS) oxidizer sump tank. This tank is the larger of the two tanks
that hold the oxidizer for the SPS engine. Sector three has the rest of
the space radiator and another RCS engine quad on its exterior panel and
contains the oxidizer storage tank. This tank is the second of two SPS
oxidizer tanks and feeds the oxidizer sump tank in sector two. Sector four
contains most of the electrical power generating equipment. It contains
three fuel cells, two cryogenic oxygen and two cryogenic hydrogen tanks,
and a power control relay box.  The cryogenic tanks supply oxygen to the
environmental control subsystem and oxygen and hydrogen to the fuel cells.
Sector five has part of an environmental control radiator and an RCS
engine quad on the exterior panel and contains the SPS engine fuel sump
tank. This tank feeds the engine and is also connected by feed lines to
the storage tank in sector six. Sector six has the rest of the
environmental control raditor and an RCS engine quad on its exterior and
contains the SPS engine fuel storage tank which feeds the fuel sump tank
in sector five.  The tanks are used to provide helium pressurant for the
SPS propellant tanks.

     Propulsion - Main spacecraft propulsion is provided by the
20500-pound thrust SPS. The SPS engine is a restartable, non-throttleable
engine which uses nitrogen tetroxide (N204) as an oxidizer and a 50-50
mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical-dimethylhydrazine (UDMX) as fuel.
(These propellants are hypergolic, i.e., they burn spontaneously when
combined without need for an igniter.) This engine is used for major
velocity changes during the mission, such as midcourse corrections, lunar
orbit insertion, transearth injection, and CSM aborts. The SPS engine
responds to automatic firing commands from the guidance and navigation
system or to commands from manual controls. The engine assembly is
gimbal-mounted to allow engine thrust-vector alignment with the spacecraft
center of mass to preclude tumbling. Thrust-vector alignment control is
maintained by the crew. The SM RCS provides for maneuvering about and
along three axes.

     Additional SM systems.- In addition to the systems already described,
the SM has communication antennas, umbilical connections, and several
exterior mounted lights. The four antennas on the outside of the SM are
the steerable S-band high-gain antenna, mounted on the aft bulkhead; two
VHF omnidirectional antennas, mounted on opposite sides of the module near
the top; and the rendezvous radar transponder antenna, mounted in the SM
fairing.

     Seven lights are mounted in the aluminum panels of the fairing.
Four lights (one red, one green, and two amber) are used to aid the
astronauts in docking: one is a floodlight which can be turned on to
give astronauts visibility during extravehicular activities, one is a
flashing beacon used to aid in rendezvous, and one is a spotlight used
in rendezvous from 500 feet to docking with the LM.

     SM/CM separation.- Separation of the SM from the CM occurs shortly
before entry. The sequence of events during separation is controlled
automatically by two redundant service module jettison controllers (SMUC)
located on the forward bulkhead of the SM.

Command Module

     The command module (CM) (fig. 3-7) serves as the command, control,
and communications center for most of the mission. Supplemented by the SM,
it provides all life support elements for three crewmen in the mission
environments and for their safe return to the earth's surface. It is
capable of attitude control about three axes and some lateral lift
translation at high velocities in earth atmosphere. It also permits LM
attachment, CM/LM ingress and egress, and serves as a buoyant vessel in
open ocean.

     Structure - The CM consists of two basic structures joined together:
the inner structure (pressure shell) and the outer structure (heat
shield). The inner structure, the pressurized crew compartment, is made of
aluminum sandwich construction consisting of a welded aluminum inner skin,
bonded aluminum honeycomb core, and outer face sheet. The outer structure
is basically a heat shield and is made of stainless steel- brazed
honeycomb brazed between steel alloy face sheets. Parts of the area
between the inner and outer sheets are filled with a layer of fibrous
insulation as additional heat protection.

     Display and controls.- The main display console (MDC) (fig. 3-8) has
been arranged to provide for the expected duties of crew members. These
duties fall into the categories of Commander, CM Pilot, and LM Pilot,
occupying the left, center, and right couches, respectively. The CM Pilot
also acts as the principal navigator. All controls have been designed so
they can be operated by astronauts wearing gloves. The cotrols are
predominantly of four basic types: toggle switches, rotary switches with
click-stops, thumb-wheels, and push buttons. Critical switches are guarded
so that they cannot be thrown inadvertently.  In addition, some critical
controls have locks that must be released before they can be operated.

     Flight controls are located on the left center and left side of the
MDC, opposite the Commander. These include controls for such subsystems as
stabilization and control, propulsion, crew safety, earth landing, and
emergency detection. One of two guidance and navigation computer panels
also is located here, as are velocity, attitude, and altitude indicators.

     The CM Pilot faces the center of the console, and thus can reach many
of the flight controls, as well as the system controls on the right side
of the console. Displays and controls directly opposite him include
reaction control, propellant management, caution and warning, environ-
mental control, and cryogenic storage systems. The rotation and trans-
lation controllers used for attitude, thrust vector, and translation
maneuvers are located on the arms of two crew couches. In addition, a
rotation controller can be mounted at the navigation position in the lower
equipment bay.

     Critical conditions of most spacecraft systems are monitored by a
caution and warning system. A malfunction or out-of-tolerance condition
results in illumination of a status light that identifies the abnormal-
ity. It also activates the master alarm circuit, which illuminates two
master alarm lights on the MDC and one in the lower equipment bay and
sends an alarm tone to the astronauts' headsets. The master alarm lights
and tone continue until a crewman resets the master alarm circuit. This
can be done before the crewmen deal with the problem indicated. The
caution and warning system also contains equipment to sense its own
malfunctions.

Lunar Module

     The lunar module (LM) (fig. 3-9) is designed to transport two men
safely from the CSM, in lunar orbit, to the lunar surface, and return them
to the orbiting CSM. The LM provides operational capabilities such as
communications, telemetry, environmental support, transportation of
scientific equipment to the lunar surface, and returning surface samples
with the crew to the CSM.

     The lunar module consists of two stages: the ascent stage and the
descent stage. The stages are attached at four fittings by explosive
bolts. Separable umbilicals and hardline connections provide subsystem
continuity to operate both stages as a single unit until separate ascent
stage operation is desired. The LM is designed to operate for 48 hours
after separation from the CSM, with a maximum lunar stay time of 44 hours.
Table 3-I is a weight summary of the Apollo/Saturn 5 space vehicle for the
Apollo 13 mission.

     Main Propulsion- Main propulsion is provided by the descent pro-
pulsion system (DPS) and the ascent propulsion system (APS). Each system
is wholly independent of the other. The DPS provides the thrust to control
descent to the lunar surface. The APS can provide the thrust for ascent
from the lunar surface. In case of mission abort, the APS and/or DPS can
place the LM into a rendezvous trajectory with the CSM from any point in
the descent trajectory. The choice of engine to be used depends on the
cause for abort, on how long the descent engine has been operating, and on
the quantity of propellant remaining in the descent stage. Both propulsion
systems use identical hypergolic propellants. The fuel is a 50-50
mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical- dimethylhydrazine and the oxidizer
is nitrogen tetroxide. Gaseous helium pressurizes the propellant feed
systems. Helium storage in the DPS is at cryogenic temperatures in the
super-critical state and in the APS it is gaseous at ambient temperatures.

     Ullage for propellant settling is required prior to descent engine
start and is provided by the +X axis reaction engines. The descent engine
is gimbaled, throttleable, and restartable. The engine can be throttled
from 1050 pounds of thrust to 6300 pounds. Throttle positions above this
value automatically produce full thrust to reduce combustion chamber
erosion. Nominal full thrust is 9870 pounds. Gimbal trim of the engine
compensates for a changing center of gravity of the vehicle and is
automatically accomplished by either the primary guidance and navigation
system (PGNS) or the abort guidance system (AGS).  Automatic throttle and
on/off control is available in the PGNS mode of operation.

The AGS commands on/off operation but has no automatic throttle control
capability. Manual control capability of engine firing functions has been
provided. Manual thrust control override may, at any time, command more
thrust than the level commanded by the LM guidance computer (LGC).

     The ascent engine is a fixed, non-throttleable engine. The engine
develops 3500 pounds of thrust, sufficient to abort the lunar descent or
to launch the ascent stage from the lunar surface and place it in the
desired lunar orbit. Control modes are similar to those described for the
descent engine. The APS propellant is contained in two spherical
titanium tanks, one for oxidizer and the other for fuel. Each tank has a
volume of 36 cubic feet. Total fuel weight is 2008 pounds, of which 71
pounds are unusable. Oxidizer weight is 3170 pounds, of which 92 pounds
are unusable. The APS has a limit of 35 starts, must have a propellant
bulk temperature between 50¿ F and 90¿ F prior to start, must not exceed
460 seconds of burn time, and has a system life of 24 hours after
pressurization.

     Electrical power system.- The electrical power system (EPS) con-
tains six batteries which supply the electrical power requirements of the
LM during undocked mission phases. Four batteries are located in the
descent stage and two in the ascent stage. Batteries, for the explosive
devices system are not included in this system description. Postlaunch LM
power is supplied by the descent stage batteries until the LM and CSM are
docked. While docked, the CSM supplies electrical power to the LM up to
296 watts (peak). During the lunar descent phase, the two ascent stage
batteries are paralleled with the descent stage batteries for additional
power assurance. The descent stage batteries are utilized for LM lunar
surface operations and checkout. The ascent stage batteries are brought on
the line just before ascent phase staging. All batteries and busses may be
individually monitored for load, voltage, and failure. Several isolation
and combination modes are provided.

     Two inverters, each capable of supplying full load, convert the dc to
ac for 115-volt, 400-hertz supply. Electrical power is distributed by the
following busses: LM Pilot's dc bus, Commander's dc bus, and ac busses A
and B.

     The four descent stage silver-zinc batteries are identical and have a
400 ampere-hour capacity at 28 volts. Because the batteries do not have a
constant voltage at various states of charge/load levels, "high" and "low"
voltage taps are provided for selection. The "low voltage" tap is selected
to initiate use of a fully charged battery. Cross-tie circuits in the
busses facilitate an even discharge of the batteries regardless of
distribution combinations. The two silver-zinc ascent stage batteries are
identical to each other and have a 296 ampere- hour capacity at 28 volts.
The ascent stage batteries are normally connected in parallel for even
discharge. Because of design load characteristics, the ascent stage
batteries do not have and do not require high and low voltage taps.

     Nominal voltage for ascent stage and descent stage batteries is 30.0
volts. Reverse current relays for battery failure are one of many
components designed into the FPS to enhance EPS reliability. Cooling of
the batteries is provided by the environmental control system cold rail
heat sinks. Available ascent electrical energy is 17.8 kilowatt hours-at a
maximum drain of 50 amps per battery and descent energy is 46.9 kilowatt
hours at a maximum drain of 25 amps per battery.

MISSION MONITORING, SUPPORT, AND CONTROL

     Mission execution involves the following functions: prelaunch
checkout and launch operations; tracking the space vehicle to determine
its present and future positions; securing information on the status of
the flight crew and space vehicle systems (via telemetry); evaluation of
telemetry information; commanding the space vehicle by transmitting
real-time and updata commands to the onboard computer; and voice com-
munication between flight and ground crews.

     These functions require the use of a facility to assemble and launch
the space vehicle (see Launch Complex), a central flight control facility,
a network of remote stations located strategically around the world, a
method of rapidly transmitting and receiving information between the space
vehicle and the central flight control facility, and a real-time data
display system in which the data are made available and presented in
usable form at essentially the same time that the data event occurred.

     The flight crew and the following organizations and facilities
participate in mission control operations:

     a. Mission Control Center (MCC), Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC),
Houston, Texas. The MCC contains the communication, computer display, and
command systems to enable the flight controllers to effectively monitor
and control the space vehicle.

     b. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Cape Kennedy, Florida. The space
vehicle is launched from KSC and controlled from the Launch Control Center
(LCC). Prelaunch, launch, and powered flight data are collected at the
Central Instrumentation Facility (CIF) at KSC from the launch pads, CIF
receivers, Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA), and the down-range Air
Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) stations. These data are transmitted to
MCC via the Apollo Launch Data System (ALDS). Also located at KSC (AFETR)
is the Impact Predictor (IP), for range safety purposes.

     c. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Greenbelt, Maryland. GSFC
manages and operates the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN) and the NASA
communications (NASCOM) network. During flight, the MSFN is under the
operational control of the MCC.

     d. George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Huntsville,
Alabama. MSFC, by means of the Launch Information Exchange Facility (LIEF)
and the Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) provides launch
vehicle systems real-time support to KSC and MCC for preflight, launch,
and flight operations.

     A block diagram of the basic night control interfaces is shown
in figure 3-10.

Vehicle Flight Control Capability

     Flight operations are controlled from the MCC. The MCC has two flight
control rooms, but only one control room is used per mission. Each control
room, called a Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR), is capable of
controlling individual Staff Support Rooms (SSR's) located adjacent to the
MOCR. The SSR's are manned by flight control specialists who provide
detailed support to the MOCR. Figure 3-11 outlines the organization of the
MCC for flight control and briefly describes key responsibilities.
Information flow within the MOCR is shown in figure 3-12.

     The consoles within the MOCR and SSR's permit the necessary inter-
face between the flight controllers and the spacecraft. The displays and
controls on these consoles and other group displays provide the capability
to monitor and evaluate data concerning the mission and, based on these
evaluations, to recommend or take appropriate action on matters concerning
the flight crew and spacecraft.

     Problems concerning crew safety and mission success are identified to
flight control personnel in the following ways:

a. Flight crew observations

b. Flight controller real-time observations

c. Review of telemetry data received from tape recorder playback

d. Trend analysis of actual and predicted values

e. Review of collected data by systems specialists

f. Correlation and comparison with previous mission data

g. Analysis of recorded data from launch complex testing

PART 2. APOLLO 13 MISSION DESCRIPTION

PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES

The primary mission objectives were as follows:

     Perform selenological inspection, survey, and sampling of materials
in a preselected region of the Fra Mauro Formation.

     Deploy and activate an Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package
(ALSEP).

Develop man's capability to work in the lunar environment.

Obtain photographs of candidate exploration sites.

     Table 3-II lists the Apollo 13 mission sequence of major events and
the time of occurrence in ground elapsed time.

TABLE 3-II. - APOLLO 13 MISSION SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Launch and Earth Parking Orbit

     Apollo 13 was successfully launched on schedule from Launch Complex
39A, Kennedy Space Center, Florida, at 2:13 p.m. e.s.t., April 11, 1970.
The launch vehicle stages inserted the S-IVB/instrument unit (IU)/
spacecraft combination into an earth parking orbit with an apogee of 100.2
nautical miles (n. mi.) and a perigee of 98.0 n. mi. (100-n.-mi. circular
planned). During second stage boost, the center engine of the S-II stage
cut off about 132 seconds early, causing the remaining four engines to
burn approximately 34 seconds longer than predicted.  Space vehicle
velocity after S-II boost was 223 feet per second (fps) lower than
planned. As a result, the S-IVB orbital insertion burn was approximately
9 seconds longer than predicted with cutoff velocity within about 1.2 fps
of planned. Total launch vehicle burn time was about 44 seconds longer
than predicted. A greater-than 3-sigma probability of meeting translunar
injection (TLI) cutoff conditions existed with remaining S-IVB
propellants.

     After orbital insertion, all launch vehicle and spacecraft systems
were verified and preparation was made for translunar injection (TLI).
Onboard television was initiated at 01:35 ground elapsed time (g.e.t.) for
about 5.5 minutes. The second S-IVB burn was initiated on schedule for
TLI. All major systems operated satisfactorily and all end conditions
were nominal for a free-return circumlunar trajectory.

Translunar Coast

     The CSM separated from the LM/IU/S-IVB at about 03:07 g.e.t.  On-
board television was then initiated for about 72 minutes and clearly
showed CSM "hard docking,"-ejection of the CSM/LM from the S-IVB at about
04:01 g.e.t., and the S-IVB auxiliary propulsion system (APS) evasive
maneuver as well as spacecraft interior and exterior scenes. The SM RCS
propellant usage for the separation, transposition, docking, and ejection
was nominal. All launch vehicle safing activities were performed as
scheduled.

     The S-IVB APS evasive maneuver by an 8-second APS Ullage burn was
initiated at 04:18 g.e.t. and was successfully completed. The liquid
oxygen dump was initiated at 04:39 g.e.t. and was also successfully
accomplished. The first S-IVB ALPS burn for lunar target point impact was
initiated at 06:00 g.e.t. The burn duration was 217 seconds, producing a
differential velocity of approximately 28 fps. Tracking information
available at 08:00 g.e.t. indicated that the S-IVB/IU would impact at
6¿53' S., 30¿53' W. versus the targeted 3¿ S., 30¿ W. Therefore the second
S-IVB APS (trim) burn was not required. The gaseous nitrogen pressure
dropped in the IU ST-124-M3 inertial platform at 18:25 g.e.t.  and the
S-IVB/IU no longer had attitude control but began tumbling slowly.
At approximately 19:17 g.e.t., a step input in tracking data indicated a
velocity increase of approximately 4 to 5 fps. No conclusions have been
reached on the reason for this increase. The velocity change altered the
lunar-impact point closer to the target. The S-IVB/IU impacted the lunar
surface at 77:56:40 g.e.t. (08:09:40 p m. e.s.t. April 14) at 2.4¿ S.,
27.9¿ W., and the seismometer deployed during the Apollo l2 mission
successfully detected the impact. The targeted impact point was 125 n. mi.
from the seismometer. The actual impact point was 74 n.  mi. from the
seismometer, well within th